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Reduce Housing Equity 
Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise 
The majority of  the wealth of  most elderly people is in the form of housing 
equity. This housing wealth, it is claimed, is a potential source of support for 
the elderly as they age. It is further claimed that many elderly would choose 
to transfer wealth from housing to finance current consumption expenditure, 
were it not for the large transaction costs associated with changes in housing 
equity. In the past,  it has typically been necessary for such families to move 
to withdraw wealth from housing. Indeed, the rationale for a market in reverse 
annuity mortgages  has been  that the elderly would like to withdraw  wealth 
from housing were it possible to do so without incurring the large transaction 
costs associated with moving. This paper considers whether these claims are 
correct. Two related questions are addressed: 
Given the predetermined  financial and other circumstances of families as 
they  approach  retirement  ages,  would  the  typical  elderly  family  like  to 
withdraw wealth from housing? 
Are the transaction costs of moving large, and do they constrain adjustments 
in the housing wealth of  the elderly as they age? 
The paper provides a clear answer to the first question. Were all elderly to 
choose optimal housing equity, given their existing circumstances, there would 
be little change in housing wealth on average. In particular, the typical elderly 
family  would  not choose to reduce housing  equity. The answer to the sec- 
ond question  is  less evident. Assuming  that  the elderly  could gain from  a 
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reallocation of  wealth between housing equity and other assets,  the relative 
gain, in these terms, necessary to justify moving is typically very large. Our 
evidence suggests a strong preference for remaining in existing housing as the 
elderly grow older. On the other hand, that the housing equity of the elderly 
is not typically reduced as they age is not explained by the high transaction 
costs of  moving. The elderly like it that way. 
In a predecessor to this paper (Venti and Wise  1989), we considered the 
change in housing equity when the elderly move. The primary conclusion of 
that analysis was that the elderly who move were about as likely to increase 
as to decrease housing equity. But families with low income relative to housing 
wealth were more likely to move and to reduce housing equity when they did. 
The latter finding raises the possibility  that transaction costs constrained the 
choices of some elderly who otherwise would have chosen to transfer wealth 
out of  housing. ' 
The current paper is a more formal treatment of moving and the choice of 
housing equity; the two are considered jointly. The method is analogous to the 
approach set forth in Venti and Wise (1984) and used to analyze the housing 
choices of  low-income renters. The current paper considers the allocation of 
bequeathable wealth  between housing and other assets,  conditional on their 
predetermined levels and on the income and other circumstances of the elderly 
as they age. There are two key features of the model: one is that an elderly 
family moves if  the  gain from changing  housing  outweighs the  transaction 
costs of  moving. Transaction costs are understood to include, and are likely 
to be dominated by, the psychic costs associated with leaving friends, familiar 
surroundings, and the like. The other is that the housing equity chosen after 
a move represents the optimal level of  housing equity, given current circum- 
stances. Based on the second assumption,  the model is used to simulate the 
changes in housing equity that the elderly would choose to make, were they 
to overcome the transaction  costs of  moving  and  choose  optimal  levels of 
housing equity. The analysis is based on the Retirement History Survey (RHS). 
Families are followed over the six RHS surveys, conducted every two years 
between  1969 and  1979. 
The model is described in the first section. Parameter estimates are discussed 
in the second section and the results of simulations reported in the third. The 
fourth section contains concluding remarks. 
1.1  The Model 
The goal of  the analysis is to estimate the housing equity that the elderly 
would prefer. With this goal in mind, we consider the allocation of bequeath- 
able wealth between housing and other assets, conditional on current income 
and other circumstances. Suppose that the value of housing equity versus other 
wealth can be captured by the simple function 15  But They Don't  Want to Reduce Housing Equity 
(1) 
where H  is  housing  equity,  W  is  total  bequeathable  wealth,  and  p  is  a 
preference parameter depending on income and other individual characteris- 
tics. Then preferred  housing equity is 
(2)  H  = PW. 
In fact, the precise functional form of (2),  described below, was chosen to fit 
housing equity choices. Equation  (1) was then chosen to be consistent  with 
these  empirically  observable outcomes.'  It  essentially  serves to  compare 
existing  housing  equity  with  the  preferred  level  and as a device to assure 
consistent treatment of moving and housing equity choices. 
v = HyW -  H)'-P, 
The family moves between two survey periods if 
(3) 
V* 
V"  M  > 1, 
where V* is the value of the optimal allocation of wealth, V,,  is the value of 
the allocation at the beginning of the period, and M  indicates the preference 
for current housing, presumably  with a value greater than one. It reflects the 
transaction costs that must be overcome if the family is to move. If the gain 
from moving is G, the family will move if 
(4)  G  = In  V* -  In  V,, - In M > 0. 
The transaction costs parameter M  reflects everything that gives an advan- 
tage to current housing, after controlling for the equity value of housing and 
the wealth  allocation that it  represent^.^ For example, the value function in 
equation (1) could have been written with an additional multiplicative term E a, 
where E represents attributes that accompany housing, in addition to its equity 
value. Then A In  V would include a term a(ln  E* -  In E"),  which would be 
part of what In  M  is presumed to capture. 
Transaction costs M  are parameterized  as 
(5)  InM = m, + m(X)  + e, 
where m,, is a constant term, m(X)  is a function of individual characteristics like 
change in marital status or retirement, and e is a random term. The random 
term is assumed to have the variance components form 
(6) 
where Xi  reflects variation among individuals in resistance to or preference for 
moving. It is clear that families could move for many reasons other than to 
change housing equity and that the value of  the house to the family reflects 
e, = Xi + eir,  var(X) = uf,  var(e) = 0,'  , 16  Steven F.  Venti/David A. Wise 
much more than its asset value. It is also clear that many family attributes that 
may determine moving decisions are not included explicitly in our analy~is.~ 
Thus, the individual-specific term A  is assumed to persist over time. The 
component  is  assumed  to  be  random  across  survey  intervals  and  to  be 
uncorrelated  with  A.  For  any  family,  it  captures  the  effect  of  changes in 
unmeasured variables from interval to interval. As will become clear below, 
it  may  also reflect  the effect  of  the  difference between  actual  alternative 
housing possibilities that exist in fact and the optimal choice that is assumed 
to exist. 
If E  has a normal distribution with mean zero, the probability that the family 
will move between any two survey periods, conditional on A, is 
(7)  pr[move]  = pr[E  < A In V - m, - m(X)  - A] 
= @[(A In  V - m, - m(X)  ~  A)/ue], 
where A In  V  = In V* - In V, and @ is the cumulative normal distribution 
function. 
The term A In  V is a measure of disequilibrium;  it is large if the optimal 
allocation of wealth between housing and other assets is very different from 
the  existing  allocation.  The optimal allocation, however,  is  likely  to vary 
among families. To capture potential differences among families in preferences 
for housing equity, p is parameterized  as 
(8)  p,  =  + d(Z)  + u,  E(v) = 0, var(v) = at 
That is, p is assumed to  follow a random walk with drift d(Z), where 
(9)  d(Z)  = do + d,A + d2A2 + d,Y  + d4W + d5Y.  W 
Here, the terms in age A capture the effect of age on the drift, reflecting the 
possibility that preferences  change with age. The terms in income Y are to 
recognize  that the amount of total wealth that the family prefers to have in 
housing  equity  is  likely  to depend  on  current  income,  which  along  with 
nonhousing bequeathable wealth can be used to finance current consumption. 
The disturbance  u  reflects  random changes in preferences  not  captured  by 
measured variables. 
The allocation of wealth at the beginning of the period is taken as a base 
indication of preferences, and optimal choices are considered relative to that 
base. In period t - I,  we observe HI-  and W,_  I; we set p,_  = H,- ,lW,-, . 
Desired housing in period t is then given by an estimate based on the proportion 
of total wealth allocated to housing in period t - 1, plus a deviation from that 
estimate. As the family ages, there may be an increasingly  large difference 
between Ht-,/Wt-,  and desired &, and  the extent of  disequilibrium  may 
increase. The term d(Z)  reflects this possibility. In effect, the housing demand 17  But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity 
equation  predicts  desired  changes in housing  equity.  Based  on  equations 
(8)-(9)  and the definitions above, it is given by 
(10)  H, = (H,-l/Wr-l)Wr  + [d(Z)]W,  + uWr . 
The information to estimate this equation comes primarily from the changes 
in housing equity for families who move during the survey period. In essence, 
the model estimates the preferred change in housing equity as a function of age, 
current income, and current total wealth.’ 
The random term u may be interpreted in two ways: one is as a maximization 
error, reflecting, for example, an inability to find a house with precisely  the 
optimal value.  The other is as a further indication of heterogeneity  among 
families, reflecting desired housing  choices.  The implications of both  inter- 
pretations are considered below. 
The data consist of five surveys conducted at two-year intervals. There are 
two possible outcomes for each family: (1) the family does not move during 
the entire ten-year survey period; (2) the family moves in period T and chooses 
a level of housing equity H, . The probability of the first outcome is given by 
(11)  pr[don’t  move]  = Jx{[l  - QI] . . . [l - @5]}f(A)dA, 
where @ is defined in equation (7),  the subscripts indicate intervals between 
successive surveys, andf(A) is the density of  A. The probability of the second 
outcome is given by 
where g(H7)  is the density of  desired housing equity in period  T. Given the 
family-specific term hi,  the probability of moving during the ten-year period 
of  the RHS is given by the product of  univariate normal probabilities,  each 
representing  the mobility decision  for a two-year  interval.  Integrating over 
possible values of hi is accomplished by Gaussian quadrature.6 In calculating 
the probability that the  family moves,  the terms In  V*, and  In  V,, must be 
evaluated. The first term represents the value of the optimal wealth allocation 
and is given by In  V*, = p, In H*, + (1 - pr)ln(W, -  H*,),  where H*, = 
p,W, . The  second  term  is  the  value  of  the  wealth  allocation  inherited 
from  the  previous  period  and  is  given  by  In V,,  =  p, In  H,-  + 
In summary, families are followed until they move (or until 1979, when the 
RHS panel survey ended). It is assumed that the optimal level of housing equity 
H*, is chosen when the family moves, up to an error component represented 
by  v. The family moves if  the gain from moving outweighs the transaction 
costs of moving. The predicted level of H*, is used to determine the value of 
preferred housing equity in  period  t; the value of  current housing equity is 
(1 - Pr)ln(Wt -  ~2-11.~ 18  Steven F.  VentVDavid A. Wise 
determined by the level of housing equity at the beginning of the interval, Vo,t. 
Heterogeneity in resistance to moving, or in attachment to current housing, is 
represented by a random term with a variance components decomposition. The 
family-specific component  A, is assumed to be the same, for a given family, 
over the period of the analysis. The time-varying component is E,,. The family 
moves  between  period  t - 1  and  t  if  G, = In  V*, -  In  V,,  - m, - 
m(X,)  > A,  + E,,.  The disturbance  terms  v,  A,,  and  elf  are assumed  to be 
mutually uncorrelated. 
1.2  Parameter Estimates 
Estimates are based  on data from the RHS. The survey covered families 
headed by persons age 58-63  in  1969. The families were interviewed every 
two years between  1969 and 1979; there were six waves altogether. The final 
sample is composed of 3,423 families. Of these, 24 percent moved during the 
period  1969-79.  Selection  of  the  estimation  sample  is  explained  in  an 
appendix. Estimates of the parameters in the model are shown in table 1.1. The 
estimated housing equity  function is discussed first, then  the probability  of 
moving. 
1.2.1  Housing Equity 
The disturbance term in the housing equity function is heteroscedastic, with 
the specification a,W.  The estimated u,, is .2008; the mean of W is $74,465. 
Thus, given  the ratio of  housing  wealth  to total  wealth  in  the  last period, 
current income, current wealth, and age, the standard deviation of the desired 
change in housing  equity is $14,953, evaluated at the mean of  wealth.  The 
mean difference between desired and actual equity is small, however, about 
$1,010, estimated over the whole sample. This means that on average the gain 
to be had by a reallocation of wealth between housing and other assets is small. 
The mean of the estimated values of A In  V is only .041, indicating that the 
average potential  gain, in utility terms, from a reallocation of wealth is only 
about 4 percent. It is substantially larger than that for some families, however. 
The standard deviation of  the estimated A In  V is .115. 
The mean of the estimated values of  @,  the desired proportion of  wealth in 
housing equity, is .53. The mean of the estimated values of d, the difference 
between the current and the desired proportions, is .0107. Thus, on average, 
the desired proportion of wealth in housing equity is very close to the existing 
proportion. 
There is essentially no effect of age on desired housing equity. As the typical 
family ages one year, the desired proportion of wealth in housing is reduced 
by -  .0014: .0859 - 2(.000682)age, evaluated at the mean age of 64. 
The housing equity function fits the observed choices of movers very well, 
as shown in figure 1.1. The estimated values of @-the  desired proportion of 
total wealth in housing equity-and  the observed choices H  + W  are graphed 19  But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity 
Table 1.1  Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Error 
Housing equity: 
Disturbance variance, u, 
Drift, d(X): 
Constant 
Age squared (1100) 
Income 
Wealth 
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Estimated values:  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Mean A  In  v  ,0409  .I152 
Mean In M  1.5578  ,2180 
Mean p  .5255  ,2213 
Mean d  ,0107  .0108 
Log-likelihood  -3,391.0 
Number of observations  3,423 
against total wealth percentile for movers. No systematic deviation of predicted 
from actual values is revealed. 
1.2.2  Moving 
Recall that the transaction costs parameter M  reflects everything that gives 
an advantage to current  housing,  after  controlling  for the  equity value  of 
housing and the wealth allocation that it represents. 20  Steven F.  Venti/David A. Wise 
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Fig.  1.1  Predicted vs. actual values of HIW by total wealth percentile 
0 
It  is  informative  first  to  report the  results  from  a  two-stage  estimation 
procedure:  the housing  equity equation (1  1) is estimated by  nonlinear least 
squares in the first stage, using data for movers only. The prediction of desired 
housing equity from the first stage is used to calculate A In  V. A simple probit 
equation with  A In  V and other variables that are assumed to determine the 
probability  of moving is estimated in the second stage. The relevant proba- 
bilities are of the form pr[move]  = pr[e < A In  V -  In M],  where e repre- 
sents both the individual-specific  and the period-specific random components 
of moving,  e  = A  + E. The larger  A In  V, the  greater  the  probability  of 
moving,  as  expected.*  But  A In  V  explains  only  a  small  part of  moving 
behavior.  With  no  change  in  retirement,  marital,  or  health  status,  the 
transaction costs parameter  In M, which  is  the  constant  term  in  the  probit 
equation, is large, say on the order of  1.5. Because A In  V explains so little 
of  moving  behavior,  the  constant  term  must  be  large  to  yield  the  small 
probability  of  moving  that  the  data  exhibit.  Thus,  the  results  from  this 
procedure  indicate  that  the  value  associated  with  housing  equity,  and  the 
wealth allocation that it represents, must be increased substantially-about  50 
percent-for  a family to move. Indeed, without a change in family status or 
retirement, the “transaction  costs” of  moving are apparently prohibitive for 
many families; the family is simply not going to move. This is consistent with 
the small moving probability  in any two-year interval, about .08 on average. 
Now  consider  the  maximum  likelihood  estimates  reported  in  table  1.1. 
Three key parameters determine the estimated transaction costs: m,, estimated 21  But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity 
to be 2.00; uE  ,  estimated at .77; and uh  ,  with an estimated value of .62.9  The 
mean of  the estimated values of In M is 1.56. Thus, the estimates suggest a 
mean transaction costs parameter of 1.56,  with a standard deviation in any time 
interval of 1.39. For a few, then, the resistance to moving is very small if the 
estimates are taken literally; for many more the resistance is quite large. On 
average, the value associated with the allocation of total wealth would have to 
be increased by over 50 percent to induce the family to move. 
Much more important than a potential reallocation of wealth-A  In  V-in 
the decision to move are changes in retirement, marital, or health status. The 
probability  of moving  in the  base case”  is  .075. If  the family head retires 
during the interval, the probability is increased to .122. If there is a change in 
marital  status-from  married  to divorced  or from married  to widowed, for 
example-the  probability  increases  to .150.“  A much larger proportion of 
families  in  these  circumstances have  very  low  transaction  costs,  by  our 
definition, assuming the same disturbance variance. Families who otherwise 
would find moving extremely unattractive find that it is much less so at the time 
of these precipitating shocks. 
1.3  Simulations 
There are two distinct  questions about the desired  reallocation  of  wealth 
among housing equity and other assets: one is the magnitude of the desired 
changes; the other is whether they are positive or negative. The magnitude of 
the desired  changes is shown in table  1.2. The entries in the table are the 
average (and median) of the absolute values of the difference between actual 
and desired housing equity. For a given family, the comparison is made for 
each survey year until the family moves; thus, a single family may contribute 
several observations.  Actual  housing  equity is the value  inherited  from the 
previous period.  To predict desired housing in the top half of table  1.2, the 
disturbance term in the housing equity equation (10) is not considered; it is 
assumed to reflect maximization  error. The overall average, including  both 
movers and stayers, is $5,377. It is $9,886 for movers but only $5,117 for 
stayers. The medians  show comparable differences, but the magnitudes  are 
reduced; the overall median is $2,315; it is $5,159 for movers and $2,195 for 
stayers. The difference apparently reflects the fact that, on average, families 
who move have more to gain From wealth reallocation  than families who do 
not  move. That is, to the extent  that  a reallocation  of  housing  equity  is a 
motivation for moving, the difference should be greater for those who have 
chosen to move than for those who have not. As emphasized above, however, 
it is clear that this is not the major reason for moving. The difference increases 
with both income and housing wealth quartile, especially the latter. The mean 
difference  among  movers  with  high  incomes  and  high  housing  equity is 
$20,069; the  median  is $10,189.  Among  those  with  low income and  low 
housing equity, the mean is only $3,744, with a median of only $2,233. 22  Steven F.  Venti/David A. Wise 
Table 1.2  Mean (and Median) of Absolute Values of Preferred Minus Actual 
Housing Equity, by  Move Status and by Housing Equity and 
Income Quartiles, Both Excluding and Including Disturbance Term 
Housing Equity 
Income  Low  2d  3d  4th  Total 
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12,766 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
Housing Equity 





























































































The second half of table  1.2 is analogous to the first, but the disturbance 
term  in  the  housing  equation is  assumed to reflect  desired  housing choice 
instead  of  a  maximization  error or deviation  from the  optimal  level.  To 
incorporate the disturbance term, a random draw is made from the estimated 
error distribution-normal  with mean 0 and variance  ,2008 . W-each  time 
that desired housing is predicted. Although this does not affect the expected 
value of housing equity since the expected value of u is zero, it does affect the 
absolute values of the deviation. This can be seen by comparing the values in 
the second half of table 1.2 with those in the first. For example, the average 
of  the absolute values of the desired change over all families is $5,377 when 
the disturbance term is not accounted for and $12,766 when it is. 
The values in table 1.2 indicate  the change in housing equity that would 
occur if transaction cost were zero. On average, the desired change in housing 
equity may be substantial. 
But,  also on average, the desire  is not  to reduce  but  rather to increase 
housing equity, as shown in table 1.3.  This table shows the mean (and median) 
difference between desired  and  existing housing  equity,  again  by  housing 
equity  and income and for movers  and for stayers. This table indicates  the 
housing choices that families would make were there no moving transaction 24  Steven F.  VentiiDavid A. Wise 
Table 1.3  Mean (and Median) of Preferred Minus Actual Housing Equity, by 
Move Status and by Housing Equity and Income Quartiles 
Income Housing Equity 
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costs and if  all families chose housing  equity  to optimize the allocation  of 
wealth between housing and other assets. The average difference is $1,010, 
and the median difference is $106. Families with low income and high housing 
wealth would like to reduce housing equity, but those with high income and 
low housing equity would like to allocate more wealth to housing. 
The predicted mean increase for movers is $3,258; the median is $854. Like 
the  predictions  for  all  households  together,  those  for  movers  show  some 
reallocations that increase housing equity and others that reduce it. On average, 
the increases outweigh the reductions.  The results in the second panel of the 25  But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity 
table are very similar in pattern  to  the findings reported in Venti and Wise 
(1989),  although the  magnitudes  are  smaller  here.’* The mean  predicted 
change in the housing equity of  stayers, were they to move, is $975, with a 
median of $89. Comparison of the panels for movers and for stayers shows that 
the predicted changes within the cells are typically greater for movers than for 
stayers. 
The averages of predicted percentage differences between actual and desired 
housing equity are shown in table 1.4.  Two features of the table stand out. The 
Table 1.4  Mean (and Median) Percentage Difference between Actual and 
Preferred Housing Equity, by Move Status and by  Housing Equity 
and Income Quartiles 
Income Housing Equity 
~~ 
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desired changes are positive on average and are greater for movers than for 
stayers.  And  the desired  increases  are much greater for families  with high 
income and low housing wealth than for families with low income and high 
housing equity. This pattern is especially evident among movers. On average, 
movers  with  high  income and  low  housing  equity would  like  to increase 
housing equity by 72 percent; the average mover with low income and high 
housing equity would like to reduce housing equity by only 3.5 percent. Were 
there no moving transaction costs, and if all families moved to optimize the 
allocation of wealth between housing and other assets, housing equity would 
increase  by  4.9  percent  on  average;  the typical  family would  not  change 
housing equity, as indicated by the median percent change of  .6  percent. 
1.4  Summary and Conclusions 
Mobility among elderly families is very low. Approximately  8 percent of 
RHS homeowners move during a two-year period.  The percentage increases 
very substantially, to about 15 percent, at the time of precipitating shocks like 
change  in  marital  status  or  retirement.  Thus,  most  elderly  people  are 
apparently  reluctant  to  move.  In  our  analysis,  this  is  reflected  in  large 
transaction  costs of  moving. The analysis emphasizes the potential  gain in 
utility to be had by moving and the resulting opportunity to reallocate wealth 
between  housing and other assets, under the presumption  that many elderly 
would like to withdraw wealth from housing to finance current consumption 
of  other types. This potential gain is very small, however,  for most elderly. 
Thus,  relative  to  the  potential  gain  from  a  reallocation  of  wealth,  the 
transaction costs of  moving are large. 
Nonetheless,  the transaction  costs evidently  have very  little effect on the 
housing  equity  of  the elderly.  The evidence suggests that,  although some 
elderly would make substantial changes in housing equity were they to choose 
new housing, some would choose to add to housing wealth and others to reduce 
it. On balance, were all elderly to move and choose optimal levels of housing 
equity, the amount of housing equity would be increased  slightly. Thus, the 
results reinforce  our earlier  findings and  those  of  Feinstein and McFadden 
(1989). Most elderly are not liquidity constrained. And, contrary to standard 
formulations  of  the  life-cycle  hypothesis, the typical  elderly  family  has no 
desire to reduce housing equity. This is true even among families with low total 
wealth, for whom housing equity is a large fraction of total wealth. The desired 
reduction of housing equity is largest among families with  low income and 
high housing wealth. Even in this case, however, the desired reductions are 
rather small, and these desired reductions are more than offset by the desired 
increases of other families, especially those with high income and low housing 
wealth. 
The evidence of high moving transaction costs, however, suggests that some 
families may be prevented by such costs from moving, even though they would 
like to reduce  housing  equity.  It  is  for these families that  reverse  annuity 27  But They Don’t Want to Reduce Housing Equity 
mortgages  would  apparently  be  most beneficial.  Limited  demand, though, 
may explain the absence of an active market for such financial instruments. 
Appendix 
Selection of  Estimation Sample and 
Variable Dejinitions 
The estimates are based on data from the RHS. The survey covered families 
headed  by  persons  between  ages  58  and  63 in  1969. The families  were 
interviewed every two years  between  1969 and  1979; there were  six waves 
altogether.  The initial sample contained slightly over  1 1,000 families.  Over 
8,000 families were interviewed in the last survey in  1979. 
To obtain the sample for this paper we began with all families who owned 
homes in  1969. A family was omitted from the sample if  the first move was 
to a rental unit or if data used in the analysis (other than housing wealth) were 
missing in any year prior to the first move. The remaining sample consisted 
of  4,106  families.  In  addition,  housing  equity  was  sometimes  missing  or 
misreported.  In some cases, housing equity was not reported in one or more 
years; in other cases, it was apparently either incorrectly reported  or incor- 
rectly coded in one or more years. This latter problem is clearly evident in the 
tremendous  year-to-year variation in  housing equity.  In our model,  a large 
error in reported housing equity for a family that does not move in a given 
interval  means  that  the  family  must  be  dropped  from the  sample. This  is 
because a family, at each point in time, must choose between its current level 
of  housing  equity  (inherited  from  the  previous  period)  and  the  optimal 
allocation of housing wealth.  If  housing equity is incorrectly reported  to be 
unusually high in period t, then in some cases housing equity in period t will 
exceed total wealth in period t  +  1. Unless nonhousing wealth is negative or 
housing  values  dropped  sharply  between  periods  t  and  t  + 1, such  cases 
reflect error in year-to-year reported  housing equity.  Instead  of  deleting all 
such cases from the sample, the median of housing equity (in  1979 dollars) 
over all periods prior to a move is used as the measure of  housing  equity in 
each period that the family does not move.  If  a family moves, the median 
represents the equity of the old unit; the equity of the new unit is the reported 
amount. The final sample includes 3,423 families. 
Initial estimates were obtained using reported  housing equity throughout. 
This meant that a disproportionate number of families with low housing equity 
and  low  total  wealth  were  deleted  from  the  sample. In  fact,  the  central 
conclusions of the paper are not affected by the sample selection procedure, 
although individual estimates are. 
The definitions of most of the variables are straightforward. Housing equity 
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Nonhousing  wealth  includes  real  property (less debt), motor vehicles  (less 
debt), savings bonds, corporate stocks and bonds, checking accounts, savings 
accounts, and the  face value  of  life insurance.  Total wealth  is the sum of 
housing and nonhousing wealth. The changes in health, retirement, and family 
status pertain to the two-year intervals between surveys. 
Notes 
1. The findings of the predecessor paper were very similar to those of Feinstein and 
McFadden (1989), which are based on the Panel Survey of  Income Dynamics; our 
findings were based on the Retirement History Survey (RHS). These findings are also 
consistent with the results reported earlier by Merrill (1984). 
2. More “structural”  specifications based on the asset value and the consumption 
value of housing, and on a budget constraint limiting the user cost of housing to current 
income, were rejected in favor of this simple specification. 
3. In this sense, the model is consistent with models explicitly incorporating both 
consumption and investment demands for housing,  as in Henderson and  loannides 
(1983,  1987), e.g. 
4. In their work, Feinstein and McFadden strongly reject the null hypothesis of no 
unobserved household effects on mobility decisions. 
5. It is clear from eq. (10) that the specification may be interpreted as a disequilibrium 
model, where d(Z)  represents the extent of disequilibrium in the proportion of wealth 
allocated to housing.  An  alternative procedure  is  to predict desired housing wealth 
directly as a function of age, current income, and total wealth, without incorporating 
the term H,-  ,/W,-  The use of the predetermined ratio is a way to control directly for 
heterogeneity; otherwise, it would be concentrated to a greater extent in the disturbance 
term.  Because the estimation procedure  does not  integrate over possible values  of 
desired  housing  equity,  given  the  right-hand  variables  in  eq.  (lo), more  accurate 
predictions can be  had by using the procedure that is followed here. 
6. For more explanation  in the context of  a different application,  see Butler and 
Moffitt (1982). 
7. In principle, both probabilities might involve integration over possible values of 
H*, since not all families have the same preferences and, even if they did, the optimal 
housing level may not be available at any point in time. Integration would be over the 
random term v,  when V* is evaluated. This is the procedure followed in Venti and Wise 
(1984).  It  is not  done here  for  two reasons.  It  adds  substantial complexity  to the 
likelihood calculations.  And the method used to predict desired H, already incorpor- 
ates substantial heterogeneity in housing preferences; the remaining residual variance 
is small. 
8. In this specification, unlike the standard probit model, the error variance is in fact 
estimated by the coefficient on A  In  V. 
9. These estimated  values are  sensitive to errors  in  reported  housing equity.  If, 
instead of  the median of  the several housing values reported  by  each family in  the 
biannual surveys before a move (see the appendix), the actual recorded values are used, 
all these estimates are considerably larger. 
10. With A In  Vevaluated at its mean and with all the dummy variables assumed to 
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11. In  fact, divorce or marriage are associated with a much higher probability of 
moving, about .43 (see Venti and Wise  1989). 
12. The earlier results were  actual changes in housing equity among movers by 
housing equity and income quartile, after controlling for age, calendar year, children, 
and changes in retirement,  health, or marital status.  A correction was also made for 
reporting errors. The predictions here may provide more accurate information because 
the continuous functional form does not allow measurement error-which  would be 
most prevalent among families who enter the upper right and the lower left portions of 
the table-to  exert as large a force on the results as the dummy variable specification 
used in our earlier paper. It could also be that the specification used here does not fit 
the data as well as the flexible form used there. 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
The main result of this paper is that, when elderly people move, they do not 
reduce  their  housing  equity,  on average.  To  the authors, this  suggests that 
programs that allow households  to reduce housing  equity without  incurring 
moving  costs have  not  really  caught on because  there  is  little  underlying 
demand for them. 
I believe this finding, that people in the sample do not, on average, wish to 
reduce their housing equity. I am less convinced that this explains the lack of 
demand  for reverse  annuity  mortgages.  Further,  I  am troubled  by  certain 
details of  the model specification that, while not necessarily influencing the 
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basic result about housing equity demand, do make it difficult to interpret the 
paper’s two-stage  model of housing demand and moving costs. 
The modeling approach taken here is quite sensible and straightforward. In 
each  period,  each  household  evaluates  its  optimal  level  of  housing  and 
compares it to the current level. If the economic benefit from moving exceeds 
the cost of doing so, the household moves. Loosely speaking, we can identify 
the determinants of housing demand from the sample of people who move and 
the determinants of  moving costs by imputing housing demand to the entire 
sample and then seeing who moves. 
The first problem  one encounters with  the  model  is  in  the  definition  of 
housing. There are really three relevant housing variables: the value of housing 
owned, the value of housing equity net of mortgages, and the value of housing 
consumed. Imposing the constraint  of owner occupation leaves us with two 
independent  measures  since ownership must equal consumption. Still, there 
are determinants of housing demand distinct from housing equity demand that, 
because of data limitations, must be ignored in the paper, which considers only 
housing equity as an argument of utility. Given that household preferences are 
actually  affected  by  both,  how  are  we  to  interpret  the  paper’s empirical 
findings? The answer depends on the relation between these two variables. 
My intuition is that there could be present in the population a general desire 
to decrease housing equity that is hidden by a desire not to decrease housing 
consumption. To make the argument simple, suppose there were no mortgage 
market at all, so housing equity would have to equal housing consumption. 
Then a household  wishing  to  reduce housing  equity  would  have  to reduce 
housing consumption by the same amount. Balancing these two factors might 
lead to a small average decrease in housing demand; yet, if mortgages were 
now  introduced  (or made  easier to obtain), we  might  observe significant 
decreases in home equity. An important question to which I do not know the 
answer is how freely households  in the sample can vary housing equity and 
housing consumption if they move or if they do not move. The paper’s logic 
suggests that  housing  equity  can be  changed only by  moving. If  it can be 
changed without moving, then  why should  we expect housing  equity to be 
related to the moving decision? 
Let me turn now to the model itself.  Using  six waves of  the Retirement 
History Survey from 1969 to 1979, Venti and Wise follow each family until 
it  moves or until  the sample period ends. That  is, moving  is treated  as an 
absorbing state. The decision to omit observations on families that have moved 
during the sample period does formally constitute choice-based sampling and 
introduces  potential  bias  into  the  estimation  procedure.  Given  the  low 
probability of moving in any given year, this may not be a serious problem, 
but I am not sure what the authors gain in terms of simplicity by omitting such 
observations. 
The ability to observe households several times permits the specification of 
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also have imagined a role for time effects as well, to account for macroeco- 
nomic factors  such as  mortgage rates,  overall housing  demand, etc.  The 
authors assume that households begin each period with an optimal amount of 
housing but that preferences drift (according to eq. 181) because of changes in 
observable and  unobservable  household  attributes.  This leads  some house- 
holds  to  move,  if  the  desired  change  in  housing  is  sufficiently  large  to 
overcome the costs of moving, which also vary by household. Unfortunately, 
since few households move in any given period, this specification of the typical 
household’s preferences is not time consistent. Even if it does not move to its 
optimal point in period t,  a household is assumed during period t  +  1 to have 
done so. 
A more appropriate specification would be a disequilibrium model in which, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  sample,  households  are  assumed  to  have  some 
distribution around their optimal housing equity values. Indeed, the notion of 
disequilibrium is clearly what Venti and Wise have in mind, even though their 
model  is not formally specified that way. The preference  drift function d(x) 
described in (9) is ostensibly a measure of  how preferences change over time 
to induce movements from a previous  optimum to a new  one. In  fact, the 
function is based on levels rather than changes in such variables as income and 
wealth. Indeed, what the estimates in table 1.1 tell us is that high income leads 
people to wish to consume more housing and low wealth leads them to wish 
to consume less. This is perfectly consistent with the disequilibrium approach 
and, I  think, only with this approach. My  sense is that the model could be 
reworked  to be consistent  with this approach without  the basic  story being 
fundamentally  altered.  It  is  likely  that  the  econometrics of  my  preferred 
modeling  approach  would be more complex, however.  This is because  one 
would  lose  the  independence of  current  from  past  decisions;  that  is,  the 
probability of a move would relate to past moving decisions, how long ago the 
family last moved, etc. 
My next problem with the model as estimated deals with the difficulty of 
distinguishing the determinants of housing demand and moving costs. Certain 
variables,  such as health status, are included in the moving cost function and 
ought to be there. One could argue for including such variables in the housing 
demand function, too. Other variables, such as change in marital status, seem 
appropriate primarily as determinants of demand shifts but instead are included 
only in the moving cost function. How should one interpret the reported result 
that moving costs are reduced significantly by a change in marital status? My 
intuition is that  people in this situation  move more because of  a change in 
desired housing arrangements than because of  a decline in moving costs. The 
exclusion of this and other variables from the demand shift function seems 
quite likely to have induced biased estimates of the moving cost function. This 
may have a significant effect on the model’s policy implications, as well, since 
the apparently small average change in desired housing equity indicated by the 
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into the  moving  cost function  and to exclude  them from the demand  shift 
function. 
In summary, I am reasonably convinced by this paper that the elderly do not, 
on average, wish to reduce their housing equity. This is an important result in 
itself. Without intending to diminish this positive contribution, I must confess 
to being  less convinced  by  the paper’s  explanation  of  the  determinants  of 
moving costs and the demand for housing equity and its attempt at resolving 
the puzzling lack of demand for reverse annuity mortgages. More work on 
these questions seems warranted. 